.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 2017-2019 Loup Vaillant
.\" Copyright (c) 2017-2018 Michael Savage
-.\" Copyright (c) 2017, 2019 Fabio Scotoni
+.\" Copyright (c) 2017, 2019-2020 Fabio Scotoni
.\" All rights reserved.
.\"
.\"
.\"
.\" ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
.\"
-.\" Written in 2017-2019 by Loup Vaillant, Michael Savage and Fabio Scotoni
+.\" Written in 2017-2020 by Loup Vaillant, Michael Savage and Fabio Scotoni
.\"
.\" To the extent possible under law, the author(s) have dedicated all copyright
.\" and related neighboring rights to this software to the public domain
.\" with this software. If not, see
.\" <https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/>
.\"
-.Dd December 12, 2019
+.Dd March 31, 2020
.Dt CRYPTO_VERIFY16 3MONOCYPHER
.Os
.Sh NAME
If the attacker attempts a forgery, one does not want to reveal
.Dq your MAC is wrong, Em and it took 384 microseconds to tell .
If the next attempt takes 462 microseconds instead, it tells the
-attacker they just guessed a few bytes correctly.
+attacker they just guessed a byte correctly.
That way, an attacker can derive the correct MAC, and successfully
forge a message.
This has lead to practical attacks in the past.
and
.Fa b .
.Pp
-When in doubt, prefer these over
+When in doubt, prefer these functions over
.Fn memcmp .
.Sh RETURN VALUES
These functions return 0 if the two memory chunks are the same, -1