added ietf initialization to Chacha20

diff --git a/chacha20.c b/chacha20.c
index 164b10d5614ce6efa7044afca8951492029d1de6..342090dc03bb0aa3f60e01c46e0a81a7c55a141f 100644 (file)
--- a/chacha20.c
+++ b/chacha20.c
@@ -60,10 +60,11 @@ chacha20_rounds(uint32_t out[16], const uint32_t in[16])
 static void
 init_constant(crypto_chacha_ctx *ctx)
 {
-    ctx->input[0]  = load32_le((uint8_t*)"expa");
-    ctx->input[1]  = load32_le((uint8_t*)"nd 3");
-    ctx->input[2]  = load32_le((uint8_t*)"2-by");
-    ctx->input[3]  = load32_le((uint8_t*)"te k");
+    ctx->input[0]   = load32_le((uint8_t*)"expa");
+    ctx->input[1]   = load32_le((uint8_t*)"nd 3");
+    ctx->input[2]   = load32_le((uint8_t*)"2-by");
+    ctx->input[3]   = load32_le((uint8_t*)"te k");
+    ctx->pool_index = 64; // the random pool starts empty
 }
 
 static void
@@ -93,7 +94,19 @@ crypto_init_chacha20(crypto_chacha_ctx *ctx,
     init_constant(ctx       );
     init_key     (ctx, key  );
     init_nonce   (ctx, nonce);
-    ctx->pool_index = 64; // the random pool starts empty
+}
+
+void
+crypto_init_ietf_chacha20(crypto_chacha_ctx *ctx,
+                          const uint8_t      key[32],
+                          const uint8_t      nonce[12])
+{
+    init_constant(ctx);
+    init_key(ctx, key);
+    ctx->input[12] = 0;
+    ctx->input[13] = load32_le(nonce    );
+    ctx->input[14] = load32_le(nonce + 4);
+    ctx->input[15] = load32_le(nonce + 8);
 }
 
 void
@@ -104,7 +117,7 @@ crypto_init_Xchacha20(crypto_chacha_ctx *ctx,
     crypto_chacha_ctx init_ctx;
     init_constant (&init_ctx     );
     init_key      (&init_ctx, key);
-    // init big nonce
+    // init big nonce (first 16 bytes)
     for (int i = 0; i < 4; i++)
         init_ctx.input[i + 12] = load32_le(nonce +  i*4);
 
@@ -116,8 +129,7 @@ crypto_init_Xchacha20(crypto_chacha_ctx *ctx,
         ctx->input[i + 4] = buffer[i     ]; // constant
         ctx->input[i + 8] = buffer[i + 12]; // counter and nonce
     }
-    init_nonce(ctx, nonce + 16);
-    ctx->pool_index = 64; // the random pool starts empty
+    init_nonce(ctx, nonce + 16); // init big nonce (last 8 bytes)
 }
 
 void

diff --git a/chacha20.h b/chacha20.h
index 4f1f22167a290566267d573fe824a54e30319acb..5ac197ae1cb497594e8381fefcec1b454711f1d3 100644 (file)
--- a/chacha20.h
+++ b/chacha20.h
@@ -36,11 +36,22 @@ crypto_init_chacha20(crypto_chacha_ctx *ctx,
                      const uint8_t      key[32],
                      const uint8_t      nonce[8]);
 
-// Initializes a chacha context, with a bigger nonce (192 bits).
+// Initializes a chacha context, with a slightly bigger nonce (96 bits),
+// barely enough to be selected at random (if in doubt, don't).
 //
-// It's slower than regular initialization, but that big nonce can now
-// be selected at random without fear of collision.  No more complex,
-// stateful headache.
+// The price you pay for this nonce is a smaller counter, which cannot
+// handle messages biger than 128Gib.
+// WARNING: ANY MESSAGE THAT EXCEEDS 128Gib WILL SPILL ITS SECRETS.
+void
+crypto_init_ietf_chacha20(crypto_chacha_ctx *ctx,
+                          const uint8_t      key[32],
+                          const uint8_t      nonce[12]);
+
+// Initializes a chacha context, with an even bigger nonce (192 bits),
+// more than enough to be selected at random.
+//
+// The price you pay for that is a slower initialization.  The security
+// guarantees are the same as regular initialization.
 void
 crypto_init_Xchacha20(crypto_chacha_ctx *ctx,
                       const uint8_t      key[32],

diff --git a/vectors_ietf_chacha20.txt b/vectors_ietf_chacha20.txt
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..06601d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vectors_ietf_chacha20.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+key:   000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
+nonce: 000000000000004a00000000
+text:  4c616469657320616e642047656e746c656d656e206f662074686520636c617373206f66202739393a204966204920636f756c64206f6666657220796f75206f6e6c79206f6e652074697020666f7220746865206675747572652c2073756e73637265656e20776f756c642062652069742e
+cipher:        6e2e359a2568f98041ba0728dd0d6981e97e7aec1d4360c20a27afccfd9fae0bf91b65c5524733ab8f593dabcd62b3571639d624e65152ab8f530c359f0861d807ca0dbf500d6a6156a38e088a22b65e52bc514d16ccf806818ce91ab77937365af90bbf74a35be6b40b8eedf2785e42874d